Yet another example of right wingnuts trying to disenfranchise voters. If we’re going to have fair government, we absolutely have to maximize voter particiation, and that means pushing it down to the lowest common denominator. People who are too dim to figure out “Touch here to vote for this candidate” have as much to contribute to the Democratic process as anyone else.

It’s not fraud that worries me.

I’ve talked to dozens of elderly, computer illiterate voters who didn’t fully understand what they were doing and, typical of people their age, were too proud to ask for help. Many say they won’t go through the frustration again in November.

I think Congress overreacted to the problems in Florida in 2000.

Just like your authors do.

For instance, the following quote:

There is no indication that the major vendors or testing laboratories have computer security professionals to design and evaluate voting equipment. Manufacturers make basic computer security errors, such as failing to use cryptography appropriately, or designing their own home-brew cryptographic algorithms. Moreover, regulations and tests of greater rigor than those used for DREs routinely miss accidental flaws in software for other applications, and have virtually no chance of discovering tampering with software.

Thus they are saying that vendors and testing labs don’t have computer security professionals, that their cryptography is wrong, that their algorithms are bad, and that their software is rife with bugs and errors.

But then they admit the following:

If there is tampering, it is likely present in the DRE’s code, to which election officers have no access. In fact, DRE code is usually protected by code secrecy agreements, so that no one but the manufacturer has access to it. In recent cases the complainants have not been allowed to review the code, even when DRE-based elections have been contested in court.

In short, they’re making bald assertions about the software and security used — when they’ve never even seen the code in the first place. Why?

Because they started with the preconceived notion that voting systems were all corrupt, then tried to string together evidence to prove their case.

Furthermore, any computer security professional with half a brain will tell you that the risk of system compromise is equal to the square of the number of the people who know the guts of the system. When Schneier’s being an honest consultant, he is usually the first to tell you that, if you want your code and your system design to stay safe, keep it secret in the first place.

It’s full of mere assertions and alarmist language; desperately short on relevant problem examples. It’s basically a rant.

Tortured sentences like “Accuracy is not how well the ballots are counted; it’s how well the process maps voter intent…” don’t even pass a smell test. Hint: Accuracy IS how well – that is, how accurately – the ballots are counted.

Other sentences are clearly false, such as this example: “With traditional voting machines, election officers are present to ensure integrity. But with DREs, election officers are powerless to prevent accidental or deliberate errors in the recording of votes.” Hint: I’m an election officer. I’m in the room while people vote and yes, I often help people prevent or avoid errors.

Such few real-life examples as are offered are misinterpreted. The article exclaims breathlessly, “…a March 2002 runoff election in Wellington, FL, was decided by five votes, but 78 ballots had no recorded vote. Elections Supervisor Theresa LePore claimed those 78 people chose not to vote for the only office on the ballot!” Hint: To an election officer, LePore’s interpretation is plausible. Some people really do get to the ballot booth, then decide they just don’t care. And in the days of punched cards, problems of voter misunderstanding were worse.

But most important: as described in #10, California’s electronic voting machines are already NOT paperless – so, um, how does an article on paperless models apply to this discussion, exactly?

NDT requested “proof that electronic machines are MORE fraud-prone than paper ballots” (emphasis added). The article is a total miss, on that.

Better luck next time.

http://www.schneier.com/essay-101.html

So you’re a “programmer”, eh? Ever hear of keystroke programs, or other embedded devices that can be used to track upgrades, inputs, and other out of the ordinary situations? Why are you so certain that there are no safeguards on electronic voting machines?

If you are truly a programmer, you’re engaging in the typical disinegenuous Democrat crap of claiming systems are “unreliable” because you don’t know what their security protections are — even though, as a programmer, you should know that companies ALWAYS keep security precautions close to the vest to keep people from detecting and disabling them.

Yes, whereas it is nearly impossible to commit voter fraud with paper ballots.

With a paper balloting system, you would never, ever, have a case where there was a close election, say, for governor in, for example, a state in the Pacific Northwest. Where the Republican won the first two recounts, but then partisan campaign workers were allowed to “enhance” ballots on the third recount, and then hundreds of ballots would mysteriously appear three weeks after election day, and there would be more votes cast in one heavily Democratic county than there were registered voters… and then the Democrat wins on the third recount.

That would TOTALLY never happen with paper ballots.

Why? I think part of it is local clerks don’t have access to the money necessary to run a clean system, but I also think they don’t want to run a clean system.

Technology along the lines you’ve suggested would be a big step in the right direction –

–use electronic machines;
–allow voters to walk away with a paper receipt of their vote in the mix of votes cast (Candidate Smith has 1,234,543 votes; you voted for Candidate Smith; you are voter #1822 at this precinct today at 11:55:01AM);
–require proof of ID beyond a simple match of a signature on the voter registration card (which is what they do in Michigan);
–require registration 30, 60 or 90 days prior to Election Day;
–tighten absentee voting access.

We don’t take our voting process seriously. In our country, many groups within the community don’t want voter turnout to increase –like the school districts looking for more $$$, the ballot initiative people on most ballot question, and –frankly– the candidates. They have a stake in keeping turn out low and suppressed. And they have a stake in fraud.

It’s a shame. Voter integrity is a cultural issue that BigCityDemocrats and BigLabor won’t allow to be addressed in a meaningful way unless we allow voting at home by PC/Internet and lift all restrictions that might assure vote integrity.

It’s the biggest Purple Elephant in the room in a country that claims to be a beacon of democracy and democratic values.

Just because one unscrupulous programmer COULD write a machine to cheat, does not mean that the voting machines in use today haven’t been exhaustively reviewed and controlled by representatives of all political parties to prevent cheating.

You claim the existing processes for machine review & control are insufficient. Offer specifics to explain or support your claim.

It’s true that, for the Luddites and the partisans of the world, the systems that incorporate a paper audit trail will help soothe their paranoid feelings, and I have explained and endorsed such systems in #10.

Also, the examples you cite:

“And yet these same people will, day in and day out, use ATMs, do online banking, submit credit and purchase applications online, turn the keys in their car and expect them to run, etc.”

ATMs have cameras, timestamps, and paper printouts. However, I wouldn’t recommend making cash deposits in them and I recommend getting a paper receipt for every transaction. In fact, if you’re smart, you’re scanning your deposit slips, scanning the bills that you deposit (or the front and back of the checks and money orders), going to a teller, verifying the money count with that teller as another check, and getting a receipt which you should also scan also an electronic image.
Online banking is tied to a paper-based system.
Credit and purchase applications online can also be printed and if there’s a problem with a credit purchase it can be reversed against the merchant by the credit card holder through your card-issuing bank.
Turn the keys in the car and expect it to run…and if it doesn’t start, you know there’s a problem.

Good work, Cal.

Regards,
Peter H.

I think most people are apathetic right now. I think they are frustrated with both parties, and in the end it will probably mean low turnout.

I know for me, I would like to kick a lot of congress members in the seat of their pants-they appear very dissinterested in doing anything important.